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Abstract. Potential consumers are increasingly profiled to detect their habits and 
preferences in order to provide for targeted services. Both industry and the 
European Commission are investing huge sums of money into what they call 
Ambient Intelligence and the creation of an ‘Internet of Things’. Such intelligent 
networked environments will depend on real time monitoring and profiling, 
resulting in real time adaptations of the environment. In this contribution Mireille 
Hildebrandt will assess the threats and opportunities of such autonomic profiling in 
terms of its impact on individual autonomy and refined discrimination and indicate 
the extent to which traditional data protection is ineffective as regards profiling. 
She will then highlight the potential of the draft General Data Protection 
Regulation to provide a more adequate and effective level playing field for both 
the industry and individual citizens in the profiling era. The most revolutionary 
change she detects is not the right to be forgotten or the right to data portability but 
the right to be informed about the potential consequences of being profiled. 
Keywords. profiling, KDD, transparency rights, TETs, democracy, the Rule of 
Law 
Introduction: The Dawn of A New Transparency Right? 
The draft General Data Protection Regulation that was released on 25th January 2012
1
 
contains a separate section on ‘Right to Object and Profiling’. It builds on the existing 
right not to be subject of automated decisions, if such decisions have a significant 
impact and it transforms the associated transparency right to ‘the logic of processing’ 
that informs such decisions.
2
 Art. 20 (4) of the proposal stipulates that the controller 
must provide ‘information as to the existence of processing for a measure of the kind 
referred to in paragraph 1 [automated decisions, mh] and the envisaged effects of such 
processing on the data subject [my emphasis, mh].’ Though the present ‘right to the 
logic of processing’ does not return in art. 20, the right to be informed of the existence 
of profiling and its consequences is both daring and much needed. It acknowledges the 
enormous impact of the computational underground that increasingly determines what 
we get to see and how we cognize. From the smart algorithms of major search engines 
to those underlying decision-making on creditworthiness, behavioural advertising, high 
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frequency trading and forensic expertise, profiling designates how we perceive the 
world and what we think we know. To some extend profiling has a much deeper and a 
more far reaching impact on who we become than identification technologies. In this 
contribution I will argue that the need to anticipate how profiling technologies 
categorize and pre-empt us is indeed more urgent and more defining of human agency 
than the need to prevent identification or to remain anonymous.  
I will start with a brief indication of how profiling relates to identification (section 
1), before discussing how sophisticated machine profiling differs from the kind of 
profiling we do in our everyday life (section 2). Next I will investigate profiling as the 
enabling technology for smart environments (section 3). Since profiling produces 
knowledge, rather than just data, section 5 will look into the threats posed by emerging 
knowledge-asymmetries due to the proliferation of profiling in smart environments. It 
is these threats that touch some of the fundamental tenets of democracy and rule of law, 
being the particular mélange of positive and negative freedom that allows citizens to 
develop their relative autonomy (section 4). To counter such threats the focus of legal 
scholars and practitioners should be extended from the protection of personal data to 
the protection against the undesired application of profiles and the creation of 
transparency rights regarding group profiles (section 6). Section 7 will argue a need for 
transparency by design and section 8 concludes with an appeal for cross-disciplinary 
collaboration to turn the proposed transparency obligation into an effective remedy. 
1. Identification and Profiling 
We live in the age of identification. For different reasons both government and 
business enterprise strive to develop effective tools for recurrent identification and 
authentication. Writers like Scott [49] in his ‘Seeing Like a State’, and Torpey [54] in 
his ‘The Invention of the Passport. Surveillance, Citizenship and the State’, have 
described and analyzed the insatiable need of the modern state for the registration of its 
citizens, originally seeking to attribute and implement tax obligations and register for 
subscription in the national army. The construction of the territorial nation state 
required the identification of those aligned to the territory and the nation. As a 
precondition for taxation and subscription it helped in creating the historical artefact of 
the territorial nation state. Like the introduction of national languages, national clocks 
and national currencies, the identification of citizens versus non-citizens in fact was a 
productive process, not merely the recording of a given fact. Building on the 18
th
 
century police state the 19
th
 and 20
th
 century welfare states then claim a need to 
differentiate between those that are entitled to public benefits and those that have no 
such right. Also, welfare states claim a pressing social need for identification to prevent 
fraud, crime and unlawful access in general, and in order to attribute liability, whether 
criminal or tort. E-government and e-health that aim to provide targeted services 
reiterate this quest for identification, though in this case the identification needed is 
more sophisticated and resembles what business undertakings seek when they develop 
targeted servicing and reinvent customer relationship management (CRM). 
Business enterprise is less interested in a full proof registration of the inhabitants 
of a territory. Its focus is on acquiring relevant data about as many (potential) 
customers as possible as part of their marketing and sales strategies. As customer 
loyalty can no longer be taken for granted, companies develop CRM in the hope of 
surviving the competitive arena of neo-liberal market economies. At the same time they 
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try to establish which consumers may be persuaded to become their new customers and 
under what conditions. It seems that they are less interested in unique identification of 
any particular customer then in a refined type of categorisation that allows them to 
provide targeted servicing at the right time and in the right place. Context is all is not 
just the key message of adherents to cultural theory. In fact, companies are not just 
after the attributes of predefined classes of (potential) customers, but would rather 
invest in finding out which classes they should distinguish in the first place. This is 
where profiling comes in.  
Profiling is as old as life itself. Indeed one could say that the difference between 
living and lifeless material is the fact that living organisms are capable of self-
constitution over and against an environment which is constituted as such by the act of 
self-constitution [33]. In more simple terms: an organism and its environment co-create 
each other. Profiling is thus a crucial sign of life, because it consists of a reiterated 
identification of risks and opportunities by an organism in its environment [21]. 
Profiling is the interplay between monitoring and adaptation: to survive and to 
celebrate life any organism must continuously adapt itself to changes in its 
surroundings, while it may also manage to adapt its surroundings to its own preferences 
[33]. Monitoring one's context in this sense is a matter of pattern recognition, of 
discriminating noise from information. Not all data are relevant or valid, and whether 
this is the case will depend on the context and on the moment. Adequate profiling is 
always dynamic and caught up in the loop of recognizing a pattern (constructing the 
profile) and testing its salience (applying the profile). Interestingly enough, such 
organic profiling is not dependent on conscious reflection. One could call it a cognitive 
capacity of all living organisms, without thereby claiming consciousness for an amoebe. 
One could also call it a form of intelligence based on the capacity to adapt: monitoring 
and testing, subsequent adaptation and reiterated checking is what allows the living to 
flourish. This is what enables organisms to maintain their identity in the course of time, 
detecting opportunities to grow and proliferate as well as risks that need to be acted 
upon. 
We may conclude that profiling is not typically human though we have developed 
our own brand of profiling. Cognitive psychologists speak of stereotyping, which 
allows us a measure of cognitive economy, as Schauer [46] has saliently argued in his 
Profiles, Probabilities and Stereotypes. What is special about humans is our capacity to 
reflect upon the profiles our brains come up with. This is a rare capacity, closely related 
to consciousness and language, and I shall not explore this domain much further, 
leaving it at the nexus of neurosciences and philosophy of mind ([19], [39], [22]). What 
matters is our capacity for conscious reflection on the profiles that we have 
unconsciously generated, because this gives us the freedom to deliberate on them, to 
reject or to reinforce them and to deliberately apply them. As Rouvroy [45] saliently 
describes this is what allows our self-formation. It is the precondition for our actions to 
be qualified as stemming from the freedom to act: we can become aware of the patterns 
that regulate our actions and review them to change our habits. Though most of our 
interactions are automated, handled autonomically by the habits that are inscribed in 
our body and brains, we can bring them to mind and scrutinize their relevance, validity, 
fairness and justice. This is what turns us into autonomous agents, capable of making a 
conscious choice for a course of action, deciding by which law to live. Autonomous 
derives from the Greek auto nomos: self and law. To some extent we are indeed 
capable of living by our own law, and this is also why we can be held accountable for 
our own actions ([21], [22]).  
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2. What is new? Profiling machines 
Automated profiling is new in three ways. First, we are not talking about profiling by 
organisms but about profiling by machines [16]. Basically these machines are software 
programs 'trained' to recover unexpected correlations in masses of data aggregated in 
large databases. Second, we are not talking about making queries in databases, 
summing up the attributes of predefined categories, but about discovering knowledge 
we did not know to be ‘hidden’ in the data ([59], [11]). Third, at this point in time we 
cannot reflect upon the way profiling impacts our actions, because we basically have no 
access to the way they are produced and used. This last difference suggests that 
profiling hampers our freedom to act autonomously, a point I will return to below. 
Automated profiling can be described as the process of knowledge discovery in 
databases (KDD, [17]) or machine learning [36]. KDD is generally thought to consist 
of the following steps:  
 
1. recording of data 
2. aggregation and tracking of data 
3. identification of patterns in data   (data mining) 
4. interpretation of the outcome 
5. monitoring data to check the outcome (testing) 
6. applying the profiles. 
 
Only the third step is what is called data mining in the sense of using 
computational algorithms to locate correlations, clusters, association rules and other 
patterns. An example of such profiling, using genetic algorithms, is driver fatigue 
detection by Jin et al. [27]. This type of profiling is also called behavioural biometric 
profiling (BBP) and uses a combination of pupil shape, eye movement frequency and 
yawn frequency to check tiredness in a driver. The data are mined by means of a feed-
forward neural network and a back-propagation learning algorithm. To be honest we 
must note that BBP is still in an early stage of development, even though some results 
are highly interesting.
3
 Both Zarsky [59] and Custers [11] emphasize that the 
knowledge generated by profiling machines is new. Zarsky speaks of data mining as 
'answering questions users did not know to ask' ([59]: 4). He especially focuses on the 
difference between classification based on predefined classes and data mining 
techniques, which provoke unexpected clusters. Custers ([11]:56-58) argues that this 
type of knowledge is new in comparison with traditional social science, which starts 
with a hypothesis concerning a population that is tested by applying it to a sample. He 
points out that, first of all, in the case of KDD the hypothesis emerges in the process of 
data mining and, second, the hypothesis is tested on data that resemble a population 
rather than a sample. Some provocative scientists have even declared ‘the end of theory’ 
for this reason [4], suggesting that correlations are more important than causation in the 
era of data analytics.
4
 Custers also indicates that when trivial information turns out to 
correlate with sensitive information, an insurance company or an employer may use the 
trivial information to exclude a person without this being evident as unfair 
discrimination (called masking). His last point is that the recording of data by means of 
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4
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ICT makes it practically impossible to delete records, especially where they are often 
shared across different contexts.
5
 KDD can thus trace and track correlations in a 
growing mass of retained data and confront us with inferences drawn from past 
behaviour that would otherwise be lost to oblivion ([50], [34]). This raises a number of 
questions in relation to privacy and security, especially with regard to the effectiveness 
of data protection legislation. Before moving into these anticipated threats I will first 
describe emerging smart environments such as Ambient Intelligence (AmI) and the 
Internet of Things (IoT), to explain why autonomic machine profiling will make an 
increasing difference to our lives.  
3. Smart Environments  
In this chapter the concept of smart environments refers to hybrid online and offline 
environments that anticipate their inhabitants (usually referred to as users). I will 
briefly discuss the vision of Ambient Intelligence (AmI) and the Internet of Things 
(IoT) as typical scenarios of our technological futures. Smart environments are based 
on machine leaning, which refers to the discipline that seeks to build computer systems 
that automatically improve their performance with experience [36]. 
Both the European Commission [25] and, for instance, Philips [1], have invested 
heavily in the vision of Ambient Intelligence (AmI), vaguely defined by its 'key 
elements' ([1]:14): (1) embeddedness, meaning that networked devices are integrated 
into the environment; (2) context-awareness, since these devices can recognize you and 
your situational context; (3) personalisation, as they can be tailored towards your 
needs; (4) adaptiveness, meaning that they may change the environment in response to 
your behaviours; and (5) anticipation, since they should anticipate your preferences 
without your deliberate input, the environment will always be one step ahead of you. 
Related aspects that are often mentioned in the context of AmI are its hidden 
complexity, the absence of keyboards or monitors, the fact that the environment itself 
becomes the interface, real time monitoring and ubiquitous and proactive computing.  
The enabling technologies of this smart environment are sensor technologies, RFID 
systems, nanotechnology and miniaturization. Together they create The Internet of 
Things [26], which is supposed to turn the offline world online. The IoT consists of 
things that are tagged and permanently observed while communicating their data 
through the network that connects them. We must keep in mind, though, that most of 
these technologies only generate an enormous amount of data, which may not reveal 
any knowledge until profiling technologies are applied. We may conclude that profiling 
technologies are the crucial link between an overdose of trivial data about our 
movements, temperature, and interaction with other people or things and applicable 
knowledge about our habits, preferences and the state of the environment. Only after 
running data mining techniques through the interconnected databases can the things in 
our environment become smart things and start acting like agents in a multi-agent 
network (MAS). Profiling thus creates added value in the mass of data, deciding what 
is noise and what is information.  
The vision of AmI depends on a seamless adjustment of the environment to our 
inferred habits and preferences [13]. The idea is that we need not provide deliberate 
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input, but are 'read' by the environment that monitors our behaviour. This presumes 
what Tennenhouse [53] has described as proactive instead of interactive computing, 
diminishing human intervention as far as possible. The idea was that to seamlessly 
adapt the environment we cannot afford to wait for a human interpreter but need 
profiling machines that draw their own conclusions about what we prefer when and 
where, hoping to thus solve the problem of endless choice and deliberation. In the 
mean time even the initiators of AmI have acknowledged the importance of moving 
away from proactive to interactive smart environments, providing users with relevant 
feed-back and enabling them to steer the inferences on which smart environments are 
built [2]. This requires novel types of human-machine interfacing or, better still, novel 
approaches in human-machine interaction [43]
6
. It may be interesting to note that the 
draft General Data Protection Regulation in art. 20 (2a) stipulates that in the case of a 
contractual relationship a person may only be subjected to a measure based on 
automated profiling where the data subject’s legitimate interests have been safeguarded, 
‘such as the right to obtain human intervention’. When decisions affect a person’s 
specific opportunities and more generally her capabilities, transparent human-machine 
interaction will at some point require human intervention. This should clarify how that 
person has been or will be categorized assessed and targeted, thus enabling that person 
to adjust her behaviour or to contest the categorization itself. 
4.  Democracy and the Rule of Law 
Before describing the threats afforded by the socio-technical infrastructure of AmI and 
the Internet of Things,
7
 we need to decide on what kind of threats we wish to detect. In 
this contribution the focus is not only on threats to individual consumers or tax payers, 
but also on potential threats to the socio-legal and political framework of democracy 
and the rule of law. This framework is a historical artefact, providing the constitutional 
instruments for individual citizens to counter threats to their rights and liberties. To 
make sense of potential threats against democracy and the rule of law, I will first 
discuss how these terms are to be understood in relation to profiling.  
A sustainable democracy presumes and maintains the rule of law. The rule of law 
is often defined in reference to the protection of human rights and limited government. 
With regard to the implications of profiling technologies the most relevant achievement 
of the rule of law seems to be the mix of what Berlin [6] has coined as negative and 
positive freedom [21]. Positive freedom – freedom to – regards the freedom to 
participate in public decision-making processes or the freedom to achieve one's 
personal objectives; negative freedom or liberty – freedom from – regards the absence 
of unreasonable constraints imposed on a person. Positive freedom has a long history, 
while negative freedom – as a value of liberal democracy – is a relatively recent 
invention. Stalder [51] in fact suggests that privacy, with its emphasis on negative 
freedom, is an affordance of the era of the printing press. To nourish a sustainable 
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democracy we need both types of freedom, as embodied in the rule of law [12]. For this 
reason privacy is not just a private interest but also a public good. The rule of law 
establishes constitutional protection of citizens’ rights and liberties over and against 
their government, safeguarded by an independent judiciary that shares the authority of 
the state. This is called the paradox of the Rechtsstaat: the state lends its authority to 
the courts that permit citizens to contest state authority.  
Profiling can endanger both negative and positive freedom. Negative freedom is 
often equated with opacity, retreat to a private space, the right to oblivion and 
invisibility to the public eye. It refers to a space and time to regain one's strength, to 
reflect upon one's objectives and opinions. This negative freedom is matched with a 
need to act, to anticipate and participate in the public space, for which a measure of 
transparency is needed. Without transparency one cannot anticipate nor take adequate 
action. In fact I would claim that negative freedom is an illusion as long as 
transparency is absent; whereas we may assess reality in the privacy of our thoughts, to 
the extent that we lack access to the knowledge required to probe the ‘reality of our 
reality’ the formation of our will power is steered by what we cannot assess. Thus 
widespread usage of profiling technologies may endanger the intricate combination of 
negative and positive freedom whenever we (1) think we are alone, but are in fact 
watched by machines that observe our online and much of our offline behaviour; (2) 
think we are making private decisions based on a fair idea of what is going on, while in 
fact we have no clue as to why service providers, insurance companies or government 
agencies are dealing with us the way they do. 
Referring to what has been discussed in section 2 we should admit that most of our 
interactions take place without conscious reflection; they are a type of autonomic 
behaviour that is the result of individual learning processes that enable us to move 
smoothly through everyday life. This, in itself, is not a violation of our negative or 
positive freedom. As a result of learning processes it may even be the result of the way 
we exercised our freedom in the past ([56], [22]). However, autonomous action (other 
than autonomic behaviour) is related to the possibility of deliberate reflection on our 
choices of action. For this we need to have access to the knowledge that impacts these 
choices. Without such access targeted servicing, customisation and filtering of 
information might provide us with a comfortable, golden cage; allowing us a reflexive 
life without reflection ([9], [31], [40], [52]). 
5. Threats: Knowledge is Power 
The potential threats of profiling must not be conflated with those of data collection per 
se. First, the implications of profiling for the autonomy of individual citizens do not 
depend on the collection of personal data but on the processing and mining of these 
data. The resulting profiles, which are applied to a person because her data match the 
profile, are often generated by data mining of other people’s data. What should concern 
us here is the process of constructing profiles and their application on people whose 
data were not used to build the relevant profiles (disabling the applicability of the data 
protection directive that is focused on the protection of personal data).
8
 Informational 
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privacy is all too often reduced to a private interest in the hiding of personal data. This 
reduction misses out on the knowledge asymmetry between profilers and profiled, 
which has far more implications than the information asymmetry that focuses on access 
to personal data. Second, because of the reduction of privacy to non-disclosure of 
personal data, privacy is often depicted as a private interest, to be traded against other 
interests. However, in acknowledging that privacy is not only about personal data, we 
must face the fact that privacy is also a public good that concerns a citizen’s ‘freedom 
from unreasonable constraints on the construction of her identity’ ([3]:7, cf. also [2], 
[45]).
9
 This freedom is a precondition for democracy and rule of law, as I have argued 
in the previous section. The hiding of personal data – which seems a Pavlov reaction of 
lawyers and other privacy advocates - will, however, not protect us from the impact of 
group profiling on the construction of our identity, while at the same time the hiding of 
personal data will reduce the quality of the profiles (and the intelligence of the 
environment). Third, in the discourse on public and private security, we are often called 
upon to trade part of our privacy (understood as non-disclosure of personal data) for 
security. However, neither privacy nor security are fit for private trading. While 
privacy is a public good in as far as it is constitutive of human agency in a 
constitutional democracy, security is one of the raisons d'être of the state. A state that 
does not provide its citizens with a minimum of security should be qualified as a failed 
state, incapable of protecting citizens against each other and/or abusive state officials. 
With regard to the cliché of a trade-off between privacy and security two points must 
be made. First, a loss of privacy may imply a loss of security, because it exposes the 
vulnerability of human identity, whereas the privacy of some may be traded against the 
security of others.
10
 Second, trading with personal data is problematic because we may 
expect a market failure due to the unequal access to information about the 
consequences of trading one's personal data (especially in the case of profiling [48]).
11
  
With Waldron [57] we note that the image of the scale that comes with the notion of a 
trade-off is a metaphor that functions like a Trojan horse; it delivers an entire network 
of assumptions that may fit the function of a kitchen scale but not that of weighing 
competing public goods or human rights. 
Profiling machines may spy on you, but why should you care about a machine 
watching your everyday interactions? In AmI, most of the monitoring and adaptation 
will be a matter of machine to machine communication, while these machines will not 
be interested in who you are but in what profit can be gained from which category you 
fit. How does this relate to privacy and security as constitutive (public) goods that 
enable citizens to develop the kind of agency that is presumed in constitutional 
democracy [48]? In the case of profiling, the issue of privacy and security raise the 
question of 'who is in control: citizens or profilers?' Alas, control is often reduced to 
                                                                                                                                       
what data qualify as personal data is controversial and may become thus contextual that legal certainty as to 
which data fall within the scope of the directive is lost. 
9
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10
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will indeed provide long term security. The interrelationship between the two is far too complex and we had 
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11
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hiding or disclosing personal data and this does not cover privacy and security as 
constitutive public goods. To come to terms with potential threats we need to look 
deeper into the asymmetries between citizens on the one hand and large organisations 
that have access to their profiles on the other. I am not referring to the asymmetry of 
effective access to personal data but to the asymmetry of effective access to knowledge 
inferred from data aggregates. Especially insofar as this knowledge is protected as part 
of a trade secret or intellectual property the citizens to whom this knowledge may be 
applied have no access whatsoever. Zarsky [59] has demonstrated – by analysing a set 
of examples – how this lack of access can lead to what he calls the 'autonomy trap'. 
Precisely because a person is not aware of the profiles that are applied to her, she may 
be seduced to act in ways she would not have chosen otherwise. Imagine that my 
online behaviour is profiled and matched with a group profile that predicts that the 
chance that I am a smoker who is on the verge of quitting is 67%. A second profile 
predicts that if I am offered free cigarettes together with my online groceries and 
receive news items about the reduction of dementia in the case of smoking I have a 
80% chance of not quitting. This knowledge may be sold to the tobacco industry, 
which may use it to influence my behaviour. In a way, this kind of impact resembles 
Pavlov's stimulus-response training: it does not appeal to reason but aims to discipline 
or seduce me into profitable behaviour. My autonomy is circumvented and my 
intention pre-empted ([35]:3) as long as I am not aware of the knowledge that is used. 
Zarsky [59] also warns about unfair discrimination, based on refined profiling 
technologies that allow sophisticated market segmentation. Price discrimination may be 
a good thing in a free market economy, but the fairness again depends on the awareness 
of consumers of the way they are categorised [38]. In order to have a fair and free 
market-economy some rules of the game must be established to prevent unequal 
bargaining positions, or else we have another market failure. In short the threats can be 
summarised as concerning (1) privacy, which, however, must not be reduced to hiding 
one's personal data; (2) security, which, however cannot be traded with privacy since a 
loss of the one may cause the loss of the other; (3) unfair discrimination, meaning that 
power relations must be balanced to provide equal bargaining positions; and (4) 
autonomy, meaning that our negative and positive freedom to act must be established 
and maintained, since manipulation on the basis of knowledge that one is not aware of 
violates one's autonomy. 
6. The legal framework around profiling  
Data have a legal status. They are protected, at least personal data are. Europe tends to 
understand this protection as a personality right, which opens the possibility to declare 
certain data to be inalienable. In practice, however, the leaking of personal data is taken 
to imply consent for storing and using them. Whatever the written safeguards we find 
in the data protection directive, in practice most people most of the time do not have a 
hunch of what is happening to which data resulting in the application of what profiles. 
Some US scholars, notably Lessig [31], favour commoditization in order to facilitate 
the trading of one’s personal data. In their eyes this should provide at least some kind 
of citizen's control. However, as discussed above with reference to [48], one may 
expect a market failure in the sense that due to grotesque knowledge asymmetries the 
implied consent will be based on ignorance – just like it is today. In both cases one of 
the problems is that we have no access to the group profiles that have been inferred 
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from the mass of data that is being aggregated and have not the faintest idea how these 
profiles impact our chances in life. It may be time to reconsider the legal focus on the 
protection of personal data, as well as the focus of the privacy advocates who invest in 
privacy enhancing technologies. What we need is a complementary focus on the 
dynamically inferred group profiles that need not be derived from one's personal data at 
all, but may nevertheless contain knowledge about the probability of one’s (un)healthy 
habits, earning capacity, risk-taking, life style preferences, spending habits, political 
associations etc.  
Profiles have no clear legal status. That is, they may be protected from access via 
intellectual property rights by the profiler or be considered part of a company's trade 
secrets.
12
 Protection against, or at least access to profiles is very limited. In data 
protection legislation one can locate two ways to claim access to a profile. First one can 
argue that once a profile has been applied to an individual person it becomes a personal 
data, e.g. in the case of credit scoring practices. This however, does not concern the 
relevant group profile or its relation to other group profiles, nor the way the profile was 
generated (by use of which algorithm etc.).
13
 Second autonomic application of profiles 
may fall within the scope of art. 15 of the Data Protection Directive (D 46/95 EC). 
Paragraph 1 of this article reads: 
Member States shall grant the right to every person not to be subject to a decision which 
produces legal effects concerning him or significantly affects him and which is based solely 
on automated processing of data intended to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to him  
 
The proposed art. 20 (1) of the Draft General Data Protection Regulation is 
equivalent in its wording. In short, the article seems to grant European citizens a right 
not be subjected to an automated decision in the case that this decision makes a 
significant difference to their life. The existing safeguard has four pitfalls. First, like 
Bygrave [8] suggests, it may be that if I don't exercise the right, the automated decision 
is not a violation of the directive. The draft Regulation, however, stipulates that a 
person may only be subjected to automated decisions under specified conditions, 
implying that this right is not merely a right to object. Such a stipulation will provide 
for legal certainty, creating a level playing field for all stakeholders involved in 
autonomic profiling.  Second, the 2
nd
 paragraph of art. 15 reads: 
Subject to the other Articles of this Directive, Member States shall provide that a person 
may be subjected to a decision of the kind referred to in paragraph 1 if that decision: 
 
(a) is taken in the course of the entering into or performance of a contract, provided the 
request for the entering into or the performance of the contract, lodged by the data subject, has 
been satisfied or that there are suitable measures to safeguard his legitimate interests, such as 
arrangements allowing him to put his point of view; or 
 
(b) is authorized by a law which also lays down measures to safeguard the data subject's 
legitimate interests. 
 
This seems to create many ways out for automated application of profiles. The 
draft Regulation adds under (a) – as mentioned above – that these suitable measures 
                                                           
12
 Cf. section 41 of the preamble of D46/95/EC. See [14].  
13
 The relevant group profile may determine the credit score, which is then a personal data. The profile 
would indicate that all people with a specific mix of attributes (concerning income, neighbourhood, credit 
history, gender, profession, educational background) entails a specific credit-risk. This group profile applies 
to a number of people, it is the result of data mining and not a personal data in the sense of the directive. 
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may include the right to obtain human intervention. This implies that the person 
affected by automated profiling can require the data controller to involve a human 
decision maker. Coupled with the obligation for data controllers to provide 
‘information as to the existence of processing’ for automated decision-making (art. 20 
(4)) this will provide inhabitants of smart environments with a strong protection against 
subliminal manipulations.  The third pitfall concerns the fact that as soon as the 
decision is not automated due to a (routine) human intervention the article no longer 
applies. However, in the case of autonomic profiling in an AmI environment this would 
not be an option, because the seamless real time adjustment of the environment rules 
out such human intervention. This brings us to the fourth and last pitfall of the present 
data protection regime: as long as one is not aware of being subject to such decisions 
one cannot exercise this right. The fact that art. 12 grants the right to know 'the logic 
involved in any automatic processing of data concerning him at least in the case of the 
automated decisions referred to in art. 15' does not really help if one doesn't know 
about the automated decisions in the first place. As indicated, the draft Regulation 
solves this problem, at least in theory, by creating an obligation for data controllers to 
provide information about the existence of this type of profiling. To the extent that this 
obligation does not hinge on a person requesting it, this would make a radical 
difference with the present level of protection. If the obligation to provide this 
information depends on individual requests, however, we will be back to square one. 
Obviously, if people are not aware of the computational background of automated 
decisions they will not request the relevant information and they will not benefit from 
obligations to provide it. The draft Regulation speaks of ‘the controller shall provide 
the data subject with at least the following information’ (art. 20 (4,2) jo 14). This 
suggests that the data controller should not await a request, but in fact this wording is 
similar to that under the existing Directive, so we cannot be sure about who should take 
the initiative here. 
As described in the introduction, the draft Regulation provides for a revolutionary 
novel legal requirement: the obligation for data controllers to provide ‘information 
about the envisaged effects of such processing on the data subject’. Next to an 
obligation to provide information about the existence of profiling, the data subject must 
be informed about the envisaged consequences. The problem with autonomic profiling 
– as argued above – regards the subliminal influences on the process of identity 
building. The threats to our privacy and autonomy derive from not knowing how our 
data will cluster together with other data, not knowing how they will form patterns that 
could disclose future behaviours, inclinations, health or other risks. By forcing data 
controllers to notify us what risk we are taking by leaking our data the draft Regulation 
may achieve two important goals: first, the purpose specification principle is reinstated 
as an important legal rule, because envisaging effects requires ex ante specification of 
the targeted effects; second, effects that are not intended but can be envisaged due to 
the generative nature of profiling must be assessed and communicated. This last goal is 
particularly important in smart environments that thrive on function creep [32]. As 
indicated above, profiling enables the construction of unexpected knowledge, or 
unknown unknowns. To some extent the smartness of the environment depends on 
pattern recognition that cannot be detected by either the naked human eye or 
algorithmic determination. Having a legal obligation to probe the future capabilities of 
the smart environment will require data controllers to develop some kind of 
hermeneutic of their profiling systems to anticipate how they will affect their end-users. 
To call this a revolutionary but critical obligation would be an understatement. 
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It seems that we have a double challenge here. First, the existing legal framework 
lacks adequate protection with regard to the application of group profiles. The existing 
right of access to the logic of processing is restricted to very specific circumstances that 
may not apply. Apart from that, the fact that such profiles are generally protected by 
means of trade secret or intellectual property turns the legal right of access to the logic 
of processing into an empty shell. Second, insofar as the draft Regulation pays more 
apt attention to decision-making based on autonomic profiling, the industry will have to 
invest in a technological and organisational infrastructure that enables compliance with 
the relevant obligations. Without such a socio-technical infrastructure the Regulation 
cannot provide us with an effective remedy. This would entail comprehensible, 
contestable and reliable information for individual citizens about profiles that may be 
applied to them, including the potential consequences: art. 20 (4) of the draft 
Regulation seems an excellent starting point for levelling the playing field in this 
direction. Only if such an infrastructure is in place the rule of law, especially the 
particular mélange of positive and negative freedom discussed above, can be sustained. 
7. Legal Transparency By Design 
The idea that legal protection requires articulation into the technological infrastructure 
against which protection is warranted,
14
 seems to gain currency.  
The draft Regulation stipulates in art. 23 that data controllers must implement data 
protection by design and by default. ‘By design’ refers to appropriate technical and 
organizational measures and procedures that ensure compliance with the Regulation, 
‘by default’ refers to mechanisms that ensure that ‘only those personal data are 
processed which are necessary for each specific purpose of the processing and are 
especially not be collected or retained beyond the minimum necessary for those 
purposes, both in terms of the amount of the data and the time of their storage. In 
particular, those mechanisms shall ensure that by default personal data are not made 
accessible to an indefinite number of individuals.’ It seems that privacy by design thus 
refers to socio-technical articulation of all the relevant rights and obligations of the 
Regulation, whereas privacy by default specifically targets the data minimisation 
principle.  
This is an important milestone, if the draft Regulation is enacted as such. It refers 
to what has been called constructive technology assessment (CTA), initiated by e.g. 
Rip et al. [41], building a case for 'upstream' involvement in technological design, i.e. 
not appointing ethical commissions after a technology is brought to the market but 
getting involved at the earliest possible stage of technological design. However, as we 
may guess, designers’ good intentions do not determine the actual affordances of a 
technology, due to the multistability of technological artefacts [24]. Multistability 
refers to the fact that one and the same technology often affords different behaviours, 
while it is not always easy to anticipate which behaviour will emerge once the 
technology is integrated in the socio-technical context of its users. Nevertheless, 
multistability does not imply that anything goes, or that it makes no sense to anticipate 
the affordances of technologies under construction. On the contrary, multistability 
                                                           
14
 Modern law is articulated in the technology of the script and can seen as an ‘affordance’ of the printing 
press. About the idea that legal norms need articulation in the digital infrastructure that is emerging today, 
see [21] and [23]. 
M. Hildebrandt / The Dawn of a Critical Transparency Right for the Proﬁling Era52
means that upstream involvement of potential end-users and others who may be 
affected by the technologies, will broaden the scope of technical design and increase 
the opportunities to construct a socio-technical infrastructure that does not obstruct the 
flourishing and autonomy of individual citizens.  
With regard to smart environments this is a serious challenge. To the extent that 
environments are smart due to the mining of a mass of behavioural data, minimisation 
of data processing could actually stifle the feedback mechanisms that make the 
environment smart. If we want to have our cake and eat it too, we will require effective 
transparency enhancing tools (TETs) that allow citizens to anticipate how they will be 
profiled and which consequences this may entail.
15
 This will entail a rethinking of the 
legal-technological infrastructure of smart environments. Evidently, commercial 
enterprise has an interest in protecting its trade secrets or its intellectual property rights 
in databases or software programmes. The tension between rights of access and 
corporate property rights has been acknowledged in section 41 of the preamble of the 
present Directive. It seems that the draft Regulation resolves this tension by no longer 
stipulating a right of access to the relevant algorithms and instead requiring data 
controllers to ‘tell’ their users how profiling may affect them.
16
  
Developing transparency tools would be the first step in the process of providing 
transparency by design. One could, for instance, think of inference machines capable of 
calculating the types of consequences that may be envisaged in the case of profiling. 
However, the complexity of the concerned profiling processes and the growth of 
information they engender [28], generate various novel challenges. First, the 
complexity as well as the quantity of information produced by transparency enhancing 
technologies could overwhelm an individual person, if this information were provided 
in the form of text, requiring her conscious attention. It seems that our cognitive 
economy would be flooded without a chance of making sense of the information that is 
presented. TETs will only succeed in empowering citizens if the human machine 
interfaces (HMIs) that mediate to provide transparency are as seamless and ubiquitous 
as the AmI infrastructure they aim to tame. TETs should allow a person to play around 
with the environment in order to guess how her behaviours trigger proactive 
interventions of the environment [37]; they should not inundate a person with detailed 
technical information that requires her scrutiny in a way that nullifies all the 
‘advantages’ of ubiquitous and seamless computing. The HMIs will have to 
communicate the relevant information in a way that allows one to have ‘a feel’ of the 
environment’s interpretation of one’s behaviour, rather than merely adding more text or 
graphs to the equation. This, however, does not mean that a more precise access to the 
technical details must not be available, for instance to enable a person subjected to 
unfair decision-making on the basis of autonomic profiling, to contest the application 
of profiles in a court of law. This brings us to a second major challenge, which 
concerns the fact that at some point such technical detail cannot be provided, due to the 
fact that autonomic profiling will be self-repairing, self-healing and self-managing to 
an extent that turns the whole process into a black box that even the designer of the 
                                                           
15
 Cp. [12] about the fact that data protection legislation is mainly a transparency tool, while privacy is 
considered to be an opacity tool. My point is that the transparency aimed for by the present generation of data 
protection regimes concerns personal data, without taking note of the results of data processing. The results, 
consisting of highly sophisticated group profiles, urgently need effective transparency tools.  
16
 Note that recital 51 of the preamble of the draft Regulation still speaks of ‘the logic of the data 
undergoing the processing’. It is not clear what this means in terms of access to software codes, since they 
are protected by copyrights, as the recital notes. 
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process cannot open. And, to further complicate the issue, even if the technical detail 
could be disclosed, the human mind could not possibly follow – let alone explain – 
what happens inside the profiling machines. To follow and check this we would need 
another machine with similar or even more computing capacities [55].  
These challenges should not paralyse us. They should, instead, be a wake-up call 
for lawyers, politicians and computer engineers to join forces during the construction of 
the smart infrastructures in which so much capital is presently invested. These new 
digital infrastructures will match the printing press in terms of their impact on the 
structure of our societies and this warrants speculative even if rigorous investigation as 
well as sustained interdisciplinary dialogue.  
8. Closing remarks 
Advanced profiling technologies answer questions we did not raise. They generate 
knowledge we did not anticipate, but are eager to apply. As knowledge is power, 
profiling changes the power relationships between profilers and those being profiled. 
These asymmetries challenge the relative autonomy of individual citizens and allow an 
unprecedented dynamic segmentation of society, especially if the vision of Ambient 
Intelligence is realised: based on refined real time monitoring, followed by proactive 
adaptation of our smart environment. As long as we lack the legal and technological 
infrastructure to counter the emerging asymmetry we may find ourselves in a golden 
cage: an environment that anticipates our preferences before we become aware of them.  
This contribution argues that we urgently need to develop legal and technological 
transparency enhancing tools (TETs) to match the proactive dimension of our smart 
environments. The draft General Data Protection Regulation acknowledges this need 
by attributing an obligation to data controllers to supply users with information about 
the consequences of automated decision-making. To comply with such an obligation 
the industry will have to involve cognitive scientists, computer engineers, lawyers, 
designers of interfaces and experts in human-computer interaction with a clear 
understanding of what is at stake in terms of democracy and the rule of law. The 
ensuing cross-disciplinary cooperation should allow us to sustain the legal-political 
framework that safeguards the right to be free from unreasonable constraints on the 
construction of identity in information society. 
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